


API Security – Key Considerations for Securing APIs


Dinesh Chandrasekhar – Director, Product Marketing
Balaji Radhakrishnan – Sr. Principal Consultant, Pre-Sales



Agenda


- 1 API BREACHES
- 2 RISK MITIGATION STEPS
- 3 API MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS
- 4 DEMO

APIs at the center




APIs expose sensitive data

**APIs are also the attack vector of choice
for hackers to disrupt your service or gain
access to private information**



Prominent API Breaches



Confirmed: Snapchat Hack Not A Hoax, 4.6M Usernames And Numbers Published

Posted Dec 31, 2013 by Catherine Shi (@catherineshi)

developer tech

MoonPig's API breach could cost its business

Yahoo Admits It Was Breached but Not Shellshocked

By Sean Michael Kenner | Posted 2014-10-07



SECURITYWEEK
INTERNET AND ENTERPRISE SECURITY NEWS, INSIGHTS & ANALYSIS

API Vulnerability Exposed Accounts of Delmarva Power Customers

A malicious attacker could have hijacked the online accounts of Delmarva Power customers by leveraging a vulnerability in the company's API, a researcher reported on Sunday.

Hacked passwords can enable remote unlocking, tracking of Tesla cars


Tesla Motors accounts are protected only by simple passwords, making it easy for hackers to potentially track and unlock cars, according to a security researcher.

Tesla Model S owners need to create an account on teslamotors.com when they order their cars and the same account allows them to use an iOS app to remotely unlock the car's doors, locate it, close and open its roof, flash its lights or honk its horn.

Despite providing access to important car features, these accounts are only protected by a password with low-complexity requirements—six characters long and at least one number and one letter—a security researcher named Nitesh Dhanjani said Friday in a blog post.

The Tesla Motors site also doesn't seem to have an account lockout policy based on incorrect log-in attempts, which makes accounts registered on the site susceptible to brute-force password guessing attempts, Dhanjani said.

Nissan Leaf - Hacked



- Communication between the Nissan mobile app, Nissan servers, and Nissan Leaf electric vehicles took place over completely unencrypted, unauthenticated APIs.
- Breach allowed a hacker, using only a web browser, to remotely control the car's climate functions, and read private data including userID, battery status, range, charging information, and driving history

```
GET https://[redacted].com/orchestration_1111/gdc/ACRemoteRequest.
php?RegionCode=NE&lg=no-NO&DCMID=&VIN=SJNFAAZE0U60XXXXXX&tz=Europe/
Paris
```

Top API Vulnerabilities and Mitigation Steps

When an API is hacked . . .

- API vulnerabilities surface
 - When exploits are discovered by the API publisher
 - When discovered by 3rd party
 - When an organization is actually hacked
- Exploits are rarely documented
- Public APIs are most scrutinized
- Private/Hidden APIs are also vulnerable



Top-5 vulnerabilities/mitigations

- Most common/current vulnerabilities and mitigations for securing your API
 - Client impersonation
 - Phishing
 - Brute force
 - Injections
 - Unauthorized access/compromised secrets

Client impersonation

- An attacker reverse-engineers a secret assigned to an app and uses it to call an API pretending to be the legitimate app
- E.g. Twitter OAuth Keys Leaked
 - March 2013
- E.g. Snapchat
 - December 2013




Client impersonation mitigation #1

- It's either confidential, or it isn't
 - Don't 'hide' a secret on a public app store or render it on a web page
- Learn to 'let go' of your app once published
 - Design security mechanisms assuming public clients
 - Don't grant access to resource based solely on the app identity (require user auth)



Phishing attacks


- Risk associated with redirection-based handshakes
 - Malicious 'application' pretends to be legitimate
 - Inserts its own endpoint in callback address
 - Gets token
- *E.g. Facebook February 2013



*<http://threatpost.com/facebook-patches-oauth-authentication-vulnerability-022613/77563>


Phishing mitigation 101

- Register and validate redirection URIs
- Strict validation (not partial)
- Never skip consent step



Brute force

- E.g. snapchat find_friend exploit
 - December 2013



Brute force mitigation

Supporting headless clients




Rate Limiting, Quotas, SLAs

- Targeted rate limiting specific attack vectors
 - Limit access to any resource granted without direct ownership
 - Limit failed authentication, limit password resets
- Detect brute force pattern and block
- Correlate identity, location, concurrency
- Rate limit to protect backend API
 - Global limits to prevent DoS
- Apply rate-limiting with application level awareness
 - Limit for a specific operation for each user/application
 - Limit for a specific input for each user/application

Injection

- Injection attacks, particularly in public clients scenario is at the core of the most common exploits
 - SQL/LDAP/Xpath/Xquery/Code injections
- *E.g. Injection in query parameters



*<http://forums.sugarcrm.com/f6/rest-api-sql-injection-exploit-89589/>


Injection Mitigation

- Input sanitization
 - Parse input parameters (payload/transport)
 - Apply pattern validation
 - JSON Path, XPath, XSD, JSON Schema, RegEx, ...
 - Own and tighten your metadata
 - Code-level sanitization (e.g. Prepared Statements)
- Signature-based threat detection
 - Look for injection patterns in payload and at transport level

Unauthorized access

- E.g. Unsecured API
- E.g. Authenticated client can access resource that should be restricted
- E.g. Session secret compromised

Balancing UX and Security




Unauthorized Access Mitigation

- Authentication
 - Local auth, integration into existing identity providers
 - Social provider integration
 - Federation, SAML
- Token issuing, lifecycle management
 - OAuth, OpenID Connect
 - JWT/JWS
 - Token refresh, revocation
- Assert user/app/device identities
- Scope
 - User-granted permissions
- Resource Server
 - Map token identities and resource ownership
- Identity mapping
 - SAML/OAuth/local/Kerberos/...
 - Runtime mapping internal/external


How API Management can help

CA API Management


Building Blocks of Digital Transformation



CA API Management Product Family Architecture




CA API Management Suite



Transformation Routing Traffic Control Composition

Throttling Prioritization Caching Security


API – Enable the Data and Services



Authentication Entitlements API Keys Social SSO

Token Service OAuth 1.x OAuth 2.0 OpenIDConnect

Secure Access to the API



Health Tracking Performance Global Staging Config Migration

Workflow Patch Management Policy Migration Reporting

Manage the API Lifecycle




Developer Enrollment Plans API Explorer API Docs


Quotas Rankings Analytics Forums

Manage the Developer Community

CA API Management Suite Use Cases and Deployment



Brief Demonstration





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Director API Management Product Marketing

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 @AppInt4All



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